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INTRODUCTION
In the United States lawyers have been slow starters in the field of African studies.
While American anthropologists and sociologists-and in more recent years, political
scientists and economists-have been prolific in African research,' their legal col-
leagues have, with few exceptions,2 remained silent. Perhaps this is attributable
in some degree to the natural conservatism of the breed, or-as the less charitable
may aver-to legal parochialism. More probably it is due to the pressing claims on
time and money which are made in American law schools by less exotic and, it
would seem, more immediately practical subjects; then, too, it must be borne in
mind that the freedom of the United States from colonial commitments in Africa
removed one of the incentives which induced lawyers in countries like Britain or
France to devote themselves to this field. But perhaps the main reason for the
late entry of American lawyers into this area is the fact that it is only in very recent
years, with the upsurge of independence throughout Africa, that knowledge of
African legal systems, and of their potential development, has become essential for
the effective conduct of international relations and trade. The recently won freedom
of African states has generated a new vitality, and has brought into focus new
problems of world-wide importance.
But despite the comparative novelty in America of African legal studies, it would
be a mistake to conclude that no work has been done in this field. While it is
perhaps true that lawyers, as a class, have tended to be less prolific and, possibly, less
influential in African studies than their colleagues in anthropology, sociology,
political science, and history,3 they have not in the past neglected African problems
*B.A. 1937, LL.B. 1939, LL.D. 1962, University of Cape Town, South Africa. Professor of Law and
Director of the Center for Legal Research (New Nations), University of Chicago. Author of several
books and articles on constitutional problems of the new nations, the latest being Tsm FOUNDATIONS OF
FRarmom (1961).
'An impressive record of American achievement in these fields is to be found in Howard, American
Contributions to Social Science Research on Africa, in U.S. NAT'L COMM'N FOR UNESCO, 8TH NATIONAL
CONFERENCE, AFRICA AND THE UNITED STATES-IMAGES AND REALITIES III (I96I).
' Particularization in these matters is invidious.
'The contribution of anthropologists and sociologists in the field of African law and administration
has, on the whole, been outstanding in quality and long-sustained. Colonel John Maclean, who had
been appointed Chief Commissioner in British Kaffraria in 1852, published his A Compendium of Kafir
Laws and Customs as far back as 1858. This consists of several valuable memoranda compiled, under
Maclean's direction, by Messrs. Dugmore, Warner, Brownle, and Ayliff. Though not the work of pro-
fessionally trained lawyers, Maclean's Compendium has long been regarded as an African legal classic.
Extracts are to be found in ALBERT KocotmEK & JoHN HENRY WIGMORE (EDs.), SouRcas oF ANcIENT
AND PamnTIvE LAW, reprinted in i THE EVoLTIoN oF LAw SERIES 292-325 (915). A great deal of
the more recent legal writing by contemporary anthropologists and sociologists (for example, by Gluckman,
Schapera, Bohannan, and many others) is indispensable to professional lawyers.
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and institutions. On the contrary, pioneer work of the kind begun by an earlier
generation of lawyers, like J. M. Sarbah and Casely Hayford in Ghana,4 has been
carried steadily forward, until today the corpus of legal literature in the African field
is very considerable.5
But whatever the achievements of the past may have been, new and exciting oppor-
tunities in the African field are now being offered to lawyers, as new problems come
clearly into focus. If it be true that law is, in large measure, a framework within
which a community's social, political, and economic life has its being, it is only
within comparatively recent years that in many parts of Africa the problem of ad-
justing and adapting the framework itself has become urgent, due, primarily, to
the dramatic development since World War II of modern urban and industrial
life, and their impact on tribal mores. And what is perhaps more important, it is
only since the advent of their independence that the new nations themselves have,
in modern times, had the full responsibility and opportunity to use law and legal
institutions consciously as instruments in nation-building.
The growth of African nationalism and the upsurge of independence throughout
the Continent have, indeed, given a powerful new fillip to the development of
African studies; and in law, no less than in other fields, this marks the beginning
of a new epoch. Much of what was achieved in Africa during the last century
and the first half of the twentieth century was achieved within a colonial context,
and within the limits set by colonial policy. The possibilities and perspectives are
now vastly different. A great opportunity is at hand for lawyers in Africa to do
a major job of social engineering, such as Roscoe Pound advocated in the United
States fifty years ago.
It would, of course, be egregiously naive to assume that African legal develop-
ment began in the colonial era. Long before European colonization, Africans had
made their own contribution to law and its administration;" and now they are
free to do so again. But on this occasion the challenge is greater than ever before.
For the first time African states are taking their place as adult members of an
international society; and within their own borders, they are beginning to grapple
with the formidable task of welding together what was good in the colonial heritage,
'J. M. SARBAH, FANTn CusroMARY LAWS (ist ed. 1897; 2d ed. 1904), and FANTS NATIONAL CONSrsTU-
TION (igo6); CASELY HAYFORD, GOLD COAST NATIvE INSTITUTIONS (1903).
'Here again, particularization is invidious, and a comprehensive bibliography is beyond the scope of
this paper. Suffice it to say that the volume of authoritative writing by lawyers in African countries has
in recent years grown enormously, especially in Nigeria (e.g., Elias, Coker, and Ajayi), Ghana (e.g.,
Branford Griffith, Redwar, Rattray, Danquah, and Ollennu), French-speaking West Africa (d'Arboussier),
and South Africa; and that no bibliography of African studies would be adequate which did not take
account of the contributions made, among English lawyers, by Professors Arthur Phillips and J. N. D.
Anderson and Dr. A. N. Allott; among French lawyers, by Luchaire, Rolland, and Lampue; among
Belgian lawyers, by Sohier and Solus; and among Dutch lawyers, by Kollewijn and Korn.
Valuable bibliographies are to be found in A. ARTHuR SCILLER, StLLA us IN AFRICAN LAW (196i);
P. J. IDENBURO (ED.), THE FUTIuRE OF CusToMARY LAw IN AFRICA (956); T. 0. EmAS, THe NAruR
OF AFRICAN CusroDARY LAw (1956); A. N. ALLo-rr, EssAYS IN AFRICAN LAw (*960); and in the various
issues of the journal of African Law (vols. 1-5, 1957-i96i), edited by Dr. A. N. Allott.
' See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
AFPICAN LEGAL STUDIES 547
and indeed what they may find to be good anywhere, with what they deem worthy
of preservation in their own indigenous institutions-so as to make a stable, healthy,
and viable whole.
And so, it is perhaps worthwhile, as new vistas begin to open up, to take stock
of the position and give some attention to the why, the what, and the how of legal
work in this field.
A. Identifying the Legal Problem Areas in Africa
A comprehensive and systematic discussion of the subject matter of this study,
even if confined to basic aspects, would require a treatise, rather than a single
paper, and-more pertinently-it would call for range of knowledge, experience, and
interest beyond the scope of most men, and certainly beyond mine.
A start may be made, however, by attempting to formulate some of the main
legal problems that await solution in contemporary Africa; or, more accurately and
also more modestly, one may begin by outlining the legal "problem areas." And
thereafter it may be helpful to discuss what can and should be done to help-both
in Africa itself, and outside Africa.
Looking at the matter from the inside, so to speak, from within Africa itself,
it is fair to say that the subjects within the lawyer's province which are likely to
hold the main interest of Africans throughout the continent for a substantial period
of time-and which, I believe, should also hold the interest of American scholars-
fall broadly under six heads. These may be specified briefly and in summary
form as follows, reserving fuller explanation and discussion for later in this
paper:
i. The phenomenon of cultural and legal pluralism, with particular reference to the
nature and future of indigenous "customary law" and of other "personal" systems
in Africa.
2. The problems to which cultural and legal pluralism gives rise, with particular
reference to the evolution of national legal systems and their role in nation-
building; the problem of interpersonal or internal conflict of laws; and the mutual
interaction and accommodation of Romanistic and English common law systems
within a single political unit.
3. The reform of private law, with particular reference to the accommodation in
African legal systems of the facts of growing industrialization and urbanization;
the development and improvement of the law relating to land-tenure, succession,
the family, and the status of women; and with particular reference, also, to the
provision of an adequate corpus of modern commercial and industrial law.
4. Constitutional and administrative law, with special reference to the technique of
constitution-making; the adaptation of various forms of government-both foreign
and indigenous-to accommodate local and contemporary needs; the status and
future of chiefs; the status and organization of the Courts and the legal profession;
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"the rule of law" and the protection of civil liberties; and the control of admin-
istrative agencies, especially in the light of the growth of state-controlled economic
enterprises.
5.international law and legal studies, conceived in a broad context of international
relations and organization; international banking, trade and investment; the
amelioration of economic underdevelopment; and the relevance and future role in
Africa of the European Common Market and of African organizations of a similar
kind.
6. Legal education, with special reference to the role of comparative law and legal
history; the teaching of the elements of Romanistic legal systems to students with
a British or American background; the problem of interpreting the United States
legal system in an English common law setting, and vice versa.
There are no doubt those who would prefer to group these topics under other,
perhaps more suggestive and fruitful headings. Again, it is probable that there
are important topics which have been omitted from this brief summary but which
claim and will receive attention. Moreover, it must be borne in mind that emphases
and priorities will vary from time to time in different parts of Africa. The priorities,
for example, in Nigeria are not the same as those in the Cameroons or in Ethiopia,
and these differ in turn from the priorities in, say, South Africa or in the Central
African Federation. Differences of opinion on these matters do, in fact, exist and
they are healthy; for they serve to focus attention on the old Aristotelian truth
that at the beginning of any subject lies the problem of asking the right questions,
and they may also induce a decent humility in any attempt to define the scope
of African legal studies.
But, broadly speaking, it may, I think, be accepted that the "problem areas"
enumerated above are, and will for some time remain, of compelling interest to the
African continent as a whole. This may become more readily apparent when,
presently, I deal more fully with each in turn.
B. Differences in the Potential Interest of Various Countries and Institutions,
and in Their Capacity to Contribute
When we look to the contribution which various countries may have to make
towards the solution of African problems, it appears helpful to draw certain dis-
tinctions.
In the first place it should be emphasized that there are aspects of African legal
studies which have jurisprudential interest of a more or less universal character.
Among these may be cited the problems of "reception," "infiltration," and "hybridi-
zation," and the respective roles of legislation, custom, the judicial process and pro-
fessional opinion in legal development 7 In these fields familiarity with some
African material may do much to stimulate jurisprudential studies in any major law
7In regard to one specific but important aspect of the role of legislation, see infra at 552-53.
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school anywhere.8 It adds materially to the interest of a course on the nature of
the legal process in modern Western societies to call attention to differences in
approach and emphasis obtaining in other societies in regard to such matters as, for
example, the role of the judge or the legal practitioner in litigation or arbitration;
and it is plainly valuable to try to account for the differences. Nor is there any
longer much excuse for neglecting these and similar topics; for a substantial and
relevant body of literature has begun to accumulate, especially in recent years, in
regard to AfricaO
On the other hand there are many subjects of less universal and more localized
interest, in regard to which it is by no means the case that all countries are equipped
to make an effective contribution or, indeed, would be interested in trying to do so.
Thus, to cite an example given by Professor Max Rheinstein,' ° differences in school
background, methods of instruction and examination, and-above all-in the length
of time required to obtain a professional qualification, will no doubt continue to
induce Africans from former British territories to study at British institutions of legal
education rather than at American universities-at any rate at the first degree level.
And in those parts of Africa where the legal system is Romanistic, it need
hardly be said the basic legal training will continue to take place either in Africa or
in Europe.
At the postgraduate level, however, the scope for African legal studies is plainly
wider, though here again, the range of available facilities and probable specialization
will differ from country to country, and indeed from university to university.
It would, for example, seem quite natural for, say, a Canadian university to give
particular attention to problems of legal pluralism, federalism, and closer association
in West Africa, taking in both the areas which were formerly under British control
and the French-speaking areas. Indeed certain Canadian universities may be in a
peculiarly favorable position in this regard, not only because of language facilities,
but also because of the psychological advantage which may derive from previous
non-commitment in the colonial field.
In Africa itself interesting possibilities of potential specialization present them-
selves. South African and Rhodesian universities, for example, are potentially well
placed to study and aid the growth of a legal system which aims not only at accom-
modating indigenous African and Islamic elements with non-indigenous (Western)
' Compare Dr. A. L. Goodhart's foreword to MAx GLUCKMAN, THE JUDIcIAi. PROCESS AMONG TH-
BA-OTSE Ol' NoRTHERN RHODESIA (X955), and Dean Roscoe Pound's foreword to HUNTINGTON CAImS,
LAw AND THE SocIAL. SCIENCES (1935).
'See, for example, ARNOLD L. EPSTEIN, JUDICIAL TECHNIQUES AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: A STUDY
IN AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAw (954); MAX GLUCKMAN, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS AMONG THE BARorsE
OF NORTHERN RHODESIA (1955); T. 0. ELIAS, THE NATURE OF AFICAN CUSTOMARY LAW (1956); ARTHUR
PHILLIPS, NATIVE TRIBUNALS IN KENYA (1948); PAUL BOHANNAN, JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT AMONG TH-
TIv ('957); Hoebel, Three Studies in African Law, 13 STAN. L. REv. 48 (I961). Cf. KARL N.
LLEWELLYN & E. ADAmSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY (1941); E. ADAMSON HoEBEL, THE PoLITM.L
ORGANIZAT[ON AND LAw-wAYs OF THE COMANCHE INDIANS (1940).
10 UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAw SCHOOL, HIGHER EDUCATION, LAW AND TRAINING FOR THE LAw IN
AFRICA (mimeo. i96i).
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elements, but which may also achieve a fusion of Romanistic and Anglo-American
legal thought. For the time being this exciting role may be played more actively in
West Africa than in South Africa; but one day, when present racial preoccupations,
stupidities, and digressions have passed away," Southern Africa will, hopefully,
contribute in full and great measure to a rich and distinctively African legal de-
velopment.
Again, an undoubted need would be met by the early establishment in various
parts of Africa of centers or institutes for comparative legal research of an advanced
nature. That difficulties stand in the way of an undertaking of this kind is clear.
There are, for example, delicate questions concerning location, and the relationship,
if any, between such institutes and governments and other centers of higher
learning. But these problems are not insuperable-as, for instance, the experience
of the Indian Law Institute or (to give a different example) the Institute for Ad-
vanced Legal Studies (London) has shown; and the sooner they are grappled with
in an African context the better for the future of African legal studies and indeed
the future of Africa itself.
Such being the range of this subject, it is necessary to put on one side any pre-
tensions to comprehensiveness, and to try to limit the field to what one may hope to
manage in a single paper. To this end I shall try to elucidate the "problem areas"
of contemporary Africa as effectively as I can, but in regard to what can and
should be done in various countries to help in the "solution" of problems, or
and should be done in various countries to help in the "solution" of problems, or
to advance research, I shall confine myself to what I think might usefully be
attempted by American legal scholars.
I
THE PROBLEM AREAS
A. The Phenomenon of Cultural and Legal Pluralism
Basic to an understanding of contemporary Africa is the phenomenon of cultural
and legal pluralism-that is to say, the present fact (whatever the future may hold)
that in most parts of Africa peoples of different ethnic, cultural, and religious groups
live within one and the same political unit under different systems of law.
To begin with, in most territories several different varieties of "customary," or
indigenous, African law operate side by side. Matriineal systems, for example,
differ significantly from patrilineal ones; and within each of these systems, in turn,
there are tribal and regional variations.
Then, too, account must be taken of the fundamental role that has been played
in the past in various regions of Africa, and which is still being played, by particular
Western legal systems, such as the English common law, French law, Roman-Dutch
"
1 There is a tendency among some scholars, and not a few institutions and foundations, to "write
off" South Africa as hopeless or too hot to handle. This is both short-sighted and unnecessarily timorous.
It is unsound to equate South Africa, her peoples-black, white, and brown-and her universities with
the policies of any particular government or even sequence of governments.
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law, and the laws of Belgium, Portugal, and Spain. These laws-the laws of
colonizing or former colonizing powers-have in the past all played well-defined roles
which bear re-examination. Each has, moreover, imprinted its distinctive character
on many aspects of national life; and though the future of these laws may be
somewhat more difficult to assess, it is unlikely that their influence will be obliterated.
Nor-unless I much mistake the climate of opinion-would Africans wish this
influence to be obliterated, for although the application of these Western legal
systems may sometimes in the past have been confided to fallible, because human,
hands, both the systems themselves-and, let it be added, their practitioners-have
made great contributions. The entire eradication of the colonial legal system, even
were it desired, would leave large and ragged gaps.
In this picture of legal and cultural pluralism, an added complication-or, as I
prefer to say, a source of enrichment-arises in those areas where Islamic and
Hindu groups are strong and where account must be taken of their laws.
However, to state the phenomenon of cultural and legal pluralism in this sum-
mary fashion is to give it a misleading clarity. It is one thing, for example, to say
that various systems of "customary law" operate in Africa; it is quite another to ascer-
tain with precision what rules these systems prescribe, and what are the similarities
and differences between the systems themselves. 2 Precise groundwork of this kind is
difficult and laborious, but essential. It is essential because where, as is often the
case, it is sought to change or to build upon a customary institution, one should know
exactly what one is dealing with. It is difficult work because-to mention two points
only-customary law often lacks, or defies circumscription within, a formal or
conceptual framework, and, further, what is called "customary law" in Africa is
often in the process of rapid change-changing, in fact, while the work of recording
goes on. Fortunately this work is now being undertaken, on a broad scale, under
the able direction of Dr. A. N. Allott at the School of Oriental and African Studies
in London.
In this regard, the compilation of comprehensive bibliographies should be regarded
as complementary and equally essential groundwork. Masses of valuable legal
material lie buried in rare and out-of-print "blue-books" and other official publications;
and often, too, they are be found, like flies in amber, in unexpected places-in the
pages of journals which lawyers seldom read. Years of work lie ahead in making
the currently existing material more generally known and readily available;' 3 and
it is to be hoped that in this task the unusually rich resources of the South African
and Rhodesian archives will not be neglected.
Again, it is one thing to say that peoples of various groups live in Africa under
different laws, but this leaves out of account the fact, which anthropologists have
stressed in recent years, that the line of demarcation between the groups is often
12 See generally, A. N. ALLO2r, The Unity of .4frican Law, in ESSAYs IN AFRICAN LAW 55-71 (196o).
"' Here, Dr. A. N. Allott of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London,
and Professor A. Arthur Schiller of Columbia University, are to be congratulated on making a start with
the compilation of accurate and scholarly bibliographies.
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for from clear-cut. Especially in African urban communities, it is becoming in-
creasingly blurred.
All this is not to deny that cultural and legal pluralism is still a basic fact in
contemporary Africa. It does, however, call attention, at the very outset of African
legal studies, to the need to examine the actual phenomenon itself, that is to say, its
more precise details as well as its broad outlines, its future trends as well as its
existing contours.
B. The Problems to Which Cultural and Legal Pluralism Gives Rise
Cultural and legal pluralism is, of course, by no means new, nor does the
continent of Africa have any monopoly of it and of the problems to which it gives
rise. Every student of legal history is familiar with the broad outlines of this
phenomenon during what may be regarded as its heyday in Europe, from the
decline of the Roman Empire until the rise of the principle of territoriality in the
eleventh and twelfth centuries AD.14  And, no doubt, equally familiar are the
contemporary examples in the Middle East and in Indonesia.
Though the problems to which cultural and legal pluralism gives rise are mani-
fold, there are among them at least three of major interest in contemporary Africa;
and each will severely tax the lawyer's skill and the politician's wisdom.
The first and most fundamental problem may, perhaps, be stated as follows: to
what extent should the condition of cultural and legal pluralism be allowed to
continue? More specifically, if legal pluralism is severable from cultural pluralism,
to what extent should legal pluralism be discouraged? That cultural pluralism may
continue as a fact, for some time, is plain. But in several African states today
there is a discernible tendency to foster the development of a single national legal
system, and to play down the role of laws which are personal to religious, tribal,
and ethnic groups. Various reasons may be given for this trend, but perhaps the
most obvious ones are that a uniform national legal system may aid the development
of national unity and sentiment, and, if conceived on modern lines, may at the
same time contribute towards the "modernization" of a country previously regarded
as "backward." It was partly for these reasons that in Turkey in 1926 Kemal
Atatfirk sought to eliminate pluralism at one stroke by the radical substitution of
a modern law of Swiss origin for the then prevailing multiplicity of personal religious
laws in the Ottoman Empire.' 5
Now, although in contemporary Africa the facts of urbanization and industrializa-
tion have already wrought big changes in customary law and sapped its strength,
it remains true that there are obvious dangers in attempting to force the pace along
the lines favored by Kemal Atat'irk. Not only may such an attempt prove divisive
"The leading work in the field is probably still KARL NEuMEYER, DIE GEMFINRECHT-ICHE ENTWICoK-
LUNG DES INTERNATIONALEN PPiVAT-UND STRAFRECHTs BIS BARTOLUs (2 VotS.) (i9ox and 19o6).5 See, generally, Le Colloque d'Istanbul sur le Problbme de la Reception des droits 1trangers, 6 ANNALTS
DE LA FACULTA DE DRoIT D'ISTANBUL V-Xii, 1-25X (s956).
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rather than unifying, but it would seem that there are other more thorough-going
and effective methods of encouraging the growth of a uniform legal system.
Some branches of law are more deeply and emotionally involved with the life and
culture of a people than others and hence more resistant to sudden and radical
change by legislative fiat. This is the case, for example, with family law and the law
of succession as distinct from, say, the law relating to such impersonal transactions
as negotiable instruments. For this reason, family law may well lend itself more
easily, and ultimately, more effectively, to adaptation and development by the gradual
process of judicial interpretation and the influence of professional opinion, rather
than by radical legislative reform.' However, even within the field of family law,
generalizations of this kind should, in the present state of knowledge, be made
with caution. It is, for example, being suggested in Ghana at the present time that
polygamy may be discouraged by a statutory provision to the effect that only one
"marriage" may be registered, and that only the spouse of a registered union shall
be entitled to succeed on intestacy. 7  The effect of the proposal, if it becomes
law, and of the indirect sanction which it imposes, will be studied with interest.
Another fruitful approach to the general problem, although limited in scope, would
seem to be that favored by the late Hans Cory in Tanganyika, that is to say, the
study at depth of a group of related (for example, matrilineal) customary systems,
with a view to their recordation and gradual unification after full discussion
with tribal elders. s
But whatever the course of wisdom may be in a particular case, or in regard to
particular branches of law, the essential point to stress for present purposes is that
the nationalization or "modernization" of legal systems and the eradication of
pluralism, even where desirable, are delicate tasks that call for a high order of
statesmanship, as well as considerable legal skill and knowledge, especially of a
comparative and historical kind. It is partly for this reason that an early start in
the comparative study of law and legal techniques should be encouraged in the
currently developing African law schools. It would, for example, be very shortsighted
for African governments and their advisers to ignore the lessons which countries
like India, Turkey, and Japan have to offer in the process of developing and mod-
ernizing their legal systems.
Moreover, there should be added to the techniques of significant comparative
study the illumination to be gained from legal history. Problems concerning the
interaction of various legal systems, problems of "hybridization" and "infiltration"-
now looming large in contemporary Africa' 9 -are, indeed, the very staple of legal
history; and they merit a place in any realistically planned African law curriculum
" Compare the conclusions reached by the London Conference, in THE LoNDoN CONFERENCE ON THE
FUTURE OF LAw IN AFRICA, RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS (Allott ed. ig6o). See 4 J. AFRICAN LAW x
(196o). And see JAmEs BRYCE, Roman Law and English Law, in i STUDIES IN HISTORY AND JURrs-
PRUDENCE 98, 124 et seq. (igo).
"The Marriage, Divorce, and Succession bill of x962, introduced by the Minister of Justice.
1 8 HANS CORY, SEuMA LAW AND CUSTOM (953).1
'See generally Twining, Some Aspects of Reception, 5 SUDAN L. J. AND REPORTS 229 (Ig6o).
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that purports to offer more than a severely practical vocational training. I do not,
of course, underestimate the urgent need for practical "bread and butter" lawyers
in contemporary Africa, but wish merely to emphasize that Africa demands, and
deserves, more in addition.
A second great complex of problems to which legal pluralism gives rise is that
which has generally come to be known under the heading of inter-personal conflict
of laws, internal conflict of laws, or inter-gentile law (inter-gentiel recht) . How
should one regulate disputes between members of different ethnic or religious groups
living within the same political unit under different laws-for example, between a
Yoruba and a Hausa in Nigeria, between a Zulu and a Xhosa in South Africa, or
between a white settler and a Swazi in Swaziland?
African colonizing powers have approached this problem in various ways, which
may, however, conveniently be grouped under two heads: (i) the approach in
territories which are or have been under British or white South African influence;
(ii) the approach in territories which are or have been under continental (e.g.,
French or Belgian) influence. Within each group significant variations occur from
territory to territory. For example, French and Belgian practice are distinguishable,
as are Kenyan, Nigerian, and South African practice. 2' But, for the purposes of
the broad survey here being attempted, it is necessary to pass by the finer dis-
tinctions.
In territories which are or have been under British or white South African
influence it is usual to distinguish between
(a) inter-personal conflicts concerning transactions entered into between mem-
bers of the white colonizing group, on the one hand, and members of the
indigenous African or other groups, on the other hand; and
(b) inter-personal conflicts in disputes which do not involve members of the
white colonizing group.
In addition, one finds in these territories a dual and sometimes a multiple set of
courts: "Native Courts" for disputes between the indigenous Africans; another set
of courts-variously designated as Magistrates' Courts, Superior and High Courts-
for litigation between white persons or between whites and others; and in places
-where, for example, Islamic influence is strong, Sharia Courts for the adherents
of Islam.
In the territories which we are now discussing, both the law imported by the
colonizing power, and the higher courts established by it, have hitherto enjoyed a
special and superior status. To begin with, the law of the colonizing power performs
a two-fold function. First, it serves in large measure as an overriding common law
" Various terminologies have been suggested: see Schiller, Book Review, 4 J. AFRICAN LA-w 175
(xg6o). See generally, R. D. KOLLEWIjN, INTERGENTIEL RECT (955).2 1 For a lucid introductory sketch, see AsrUR PMLLIPS, Recognition and Application of Native Law,
in SURVEY OF AFRICAN MARRIAGE AND FAMILY LIFE 176-89 (1953). That South African practice is more
color-conscious than practice in most British colonies is plain, but it is equally plain that a color line has
operated in these matters in British colonies generally.
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for the entire territory, applicable to all persons whatever their ethnic or religious
group may be, especially in cases of serious crime.22 Similarly, where in the view
of the colonizing power, African law and custom is repugnant to natural justice and
sound morality, cases may be decided in accordance with "natural justice," which
in practice tends to be what is prescribed by the law of the colonizing power. 3
Secondly, the law of the colonizing power serves as the white man's own tribal
law-a tribal law, however, of special status; for whereas Africans are compulsorily
subject to certain branches of the colonizer's law, whites are not subject to any
branch of African customary law to which they have not expressly or impliedly
submitted themselves.
The assumption of superiority becomes even more apparent when one examines
the jurisdiction of the courts. The general pattern is that whereas the jurisdiction
of "Native Courts" is limited both as to subject matter and persons (they ordinarily
have no jurisdiction over white persons who have not consented to their juris-
diciton),2 4 the courts possessing jurisdiction over whites not only enjoy much more
extensive original and appellate jurisdiction (in the upper hierarchy, full juris-
diction), but also have supervisory and appellate jurisdiction over the "Native
Courts."
The system outlined above has shortcomings. Not only does it perpetuate racial
divisions in a hard and fast way, but it also not infrequently leads to anomalous and
unjust results, especially in cases where Africans are denied the benefits, as distinct
from the burdens, of the colonizing power's law.
The nature of these anomalies may, perhaps, be illustrated by a few South
African cases. Whatever the technical justification may be, it is not easy to explain
to the satisfaction of a fair-minded person why a man married according to African
law and custom should be held liable for household necessaries purchased by his
"wife," ' but that when it comes to the privileges accorded to husband and wife
by the law of evidence, a person married according to African law and custom is in
the same position as an unmarried person.2 6 Nor is it easy to explain why a white
widow, who had married under Roman-Dutch common law, is entitled (despite
contributory negligence on her husband's part) to damages against a person
who negilgently caused her husband's death, whereas an African widow, who had
married under customary law, is denied a similar remedy where her husband's
death is negligently caused by a white man.27
" For critical comment, see Holleman, The Recognition of Bantu Customary Law in South Africa,
in P. J. IDENBURG (ED.), TIE FUTURE o CusTomARY LAW IN AFRICA 233 (1956).
'a Practices varies from territory to territory.
24 The extent to which whites may consent to the jurisdiction of "Native Courts" differs from terri-
tory to territory.2
"Zondani v. Maaske, 18 E.D.C. 71.
" An Act to Consolidate the Laws Relating to Procedure and Evidence in Criminal Proceedings and
Matters Incidental Thereto, Act No. 56 of 1955, § 226(3) (So. Africa).
2
"Mokwena v. Laub, I943] W.L.D. 63. There are some startling statements in the judgment:
. native customs are not applicable to civilized people. ... there is no suggestion that this legality is
anything more than the legality which arises under native law and custom, and the defendant being a
European, is not bound by legality of that kind." Id. at 67.
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The pattern adopted in territories colonized by European continental powers has
several distinctive features of its own. While it would be extravagant to suggest
that continental European colonizers are innocent of the notion that the colonizer's
law has inherent superiority, it would seem that the continental approach has
avoided some of the defects which have manifested themselves in other regimes.
The key idea is that by satisfying certain "conditions d'assimilation," that is to say,
upon attaining a defined level of "civilization," an African might entirely change his
legal status. For example, by being registered as an "immatriculated native" in the
Congo, an African ceased to live under tribal law and became subject to localized
Belgian law 8
By allowing Africans to move more or less freely from one status to another, the
continental approach has, in part, avoided the dangers of administering justice on
racial lines2 But when this has been said, it must be owned that the whole subject
of inter-personal conflict of laws is in need of reform throughout Africa. Significant
reforms have already been effected in Ghana since Independence," ° but the over-all
task will be a long and delicate one. Here again, however, I would suggest that much
of value may be contributed by the techniques of comparative law and the illumina-
tion of legal history. Let me now briefly state what I have in mind.
Many years ago, in explaining the rationale of the subject of conflict of laws,
Dicey pointed out that there were a limited number of courses theoretically open
to a court when faced with a conflicts problem.' In the first place, it might refuse
to entertain the suit. Secondly, it might assume jurisdiction in an appropriate case,
but apply exclusively the substantive rules of the lex fori in determining the rights
of the parties. Thirdly, it might assume jurisdiction, and directly determine the
rights of the parties in accordance with a specially developed body of substantive
law-a kind of jus gentium or lex communis-which would be neither the lex fori
nor any one of the conflicting systems involved in the litigation. And, finally, the
court might assume jurisdiction in accordance with certain rules, and then apply
rules of conflict of laws in the strict sense, that is to say, rules which do not directly
determine the rights of the parties, but which point to the legal system best suited
in the particular case to do so.
Each of these possibilities has well-authenticated historical precedents. Thus, the
first was once the attitude adopted by the English courts;82 the second was the trend
s For a brief summary in English, with reference also to French and Portuguese practice, see ARnTuR
PmLips, Susvzy OF AFRICAN MARRIAGE AND FAMILY LIFE 181 et seq. (1953).
29 It would, however, be a mistake to exaggerate its merits. Before 1948, the process of "immatricula-
tion" in the Congro was simple and in several cases automatic; thereafter it became a more arduous
and discretionary procedure, and the standard for admission to the status of immatriculation became that of
"middle-class respectability in a typical Belgian city"--a phrase used by Dr. Phillip Whittaker, of Makere,
at a seminar held in the Law School, University of Chicago.
:
0 See, especially, the Courts Law of 2ist June, 196o.
'
1 A. V. DICEY, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND VITH RESPECT TO THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (ist
ed. z896).
32 Sack, Conflicts of Laws in the History of the English Law, in 3 LAw: A CENTURY OF PRoonEss,
1835-1935, at 342, 344 (1937).
AFRICAN LEGAL STUDIES 557
of English decisions during the eighteenth century, and, in modern times, it has,
in various forms, again found champions-notably in the United States; 3 the third
was, in part, favored by the Romans; while the fourth is what may be called
the currently orthodox approach of conflict of laws.
Putting the first possibility aside because, if uniformly adopted, it would result
everywhere in a complete denial of justice, African communities have an opportunity,
in this formative stage of their jurisprudence, to re-examine each of the three other
alternatives, to look again at the foundations of the conflict of laws, and adapt to
their own purposes what best suits their needs.
This is not the occasion to examine the possibilities of adaptation in detail.
But it may be of some use to venture a few broad generalizations. In the first
place, the exclusive application of the lex lori would often defeat the reasonable
expectations of the parties, unless the rules of jurisdiction were elaborated so ex-
tensively as to embrace virtually all of what is now called "choice of law"--an
objection stated by Dicey sixty-five years ago and, specifically, by the seventeenth
century Dutch statutists. Moreover, this objection would appear to hold good
whether one exclusively applies the lex fori to conflicts between territorial legal
systems, or intra-territorially to inter-personal conflicts adjudicated upon by dual sets
of courts administering different "personal" legal systems.
The Roman idea of developing a lex communis or modern jus gentium may
have more to offer in contemporary Africa-at any rate for intra-territorial disputes
between members of various groups engaging in transactions of a particular kind.
Increasingly, for example, there is a tendency especially in urban areas in several
African states-and it would seem to be a healthy tendency-for certain transactions
to be governed by a new body of law, a uniformly applicable jus gentium, which
is neither traditional customary law nor Western imported law. 4
On the other hand, the same technique may not be suited to all cases. Indeed,
in these matters, it would seem that African lawyers would be well advised to remain
discriminatingly eclectic; and for some problems a more fruitful approach may be
that of orthodox conflict of laws, which, of course, presupposes the existence and
applicability of separate non-uniform laws.
In speaking of the approach of what has here been called "orthodox conflict of
laws," it is important to remember that most of its current doctrines were evolved
in a comparatively few centuries subsequent to the age of the Glossators. Again,
most of its principles were developed within an international context of "territorial"
legal systems, that is to say, systems in which a single body of law is generally and
prima fade applicable to all persons within a given territory. Plainly these principles
"' This appears to be the trend of thought of Professor Albert Ehrenzweig in his recent and valuable
treatise, CoNFLucr oF LAws (1962). Professor Brainerd Currie of Duke University, while favoring
the application of the policy of the lex fori in the event of a genuine conflict, emphasizes the importance of
giving substantive rather than formal definition to what is a conflict case. His stimulating essays are
being published in collected form by the Duke University Press.
"Compare A -ms PHu.Lips, SusEy oF AFICAN MA AGE AND FAmILY LiFE 186 (1953).
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have a role to play in conflict cases arising as between different territorial legal units
in Africa (Rechtsgebiete or territoria juris); and it would seem, too, that they may
have an analogical use in solving the kind of problem with which we are at present
concerned, namely, intra-territorial conflicts of an inter-personal kind.
There is, however, another chapter in the early history of private international law
which may also have a contribution to offer towards the solution of our problem, at
any rate for the period during which legal pluralism remains an actual fact, which
in some territories may be a long period. I refer to those centuries in Europe after
the fall of Rome but before the rise of the modern principle of territoriality, during
which there operated the so-called regime of personal laws.
In a famous passage quoted by Savigny, Agobard (Archbishop of Lyons) tells us
how during the regime of personal laws it often happened "that five men, each living
under a different law, might be found walking or sitting together.""3 The Visigoth,
the Frank, the Burgundian, the Lombard, the Frisian, and so on, each lived under
his own personal law.
It is usual nowadays for some writers on conflict of laws to make a polite but
perfunctory bow to this branch of learning in a few paragraphs of elegant diversion
under some such title as Historical Antecedents. It is also usual to discount the
subject as being of mere antiquarian interest3 6 This, I submit, is a pity; for when
the subject is studied more closely, and the operative rules examined, it becomes clear
that in those early centuries a more flexible and sophisticated method of solving
inter-personal conflicts was practiced than at present obtains in many African terri-
tories-more flexible, for example, than the following rule of thumb which obtains
in South Africa:
3 7
In any suit or proceedings between Natives who do not belong to the same tribe, the Court
shall not, in the absence of any agreement between them with regard to the particular
system of Native law to be applied in such suit or proceedings, apply any system of
Native law other than that which is in operation at the place where the defendant or
respondent resides or carries on business or is employed, or if two or more different
systems are in operation at that place, not being within a tribal area, the Court shall not
apply any such system unless it is the law of the tribe (if any), to which the defendant
or respondent belongs.
At the turn of the last century scholars like Neumeyer in Germany,"s Stouff in
FranceO9 and Catellani in Italy4" did pioneer work in bringing to light the broad
outlines and rationale of the rules which were applied during the era of personal
laws; and much has been added to our knowledge of that period in recent years.
s "Es geschieht oft, dass fiinf Menschcn zusammen gehen oder sitzen, von welchen jeder nach cincm
andern Recht lebt." I FRIEDRICH KARL voN SAVIGNY, GESCHICHTE DES R6MISCHEN RECrS IM MIrrTELALTER
1x6 0834).
"o See, for example, ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, PRINCIPLES OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 6-7 (1943).
."Native Administration Act, Act No. 38 of 1927, § x(2) (So. Africa).
SNE U FYER, op. cit. supra note 14.
t' etude stir le principle de la personalit! des lois depuis les invasions barbares iusqa' an XIIO Sikle,
REVUE BOURGUIGNONNE x-65, 273-310 (1894).
i ENRICO L. CATELLANI, DlRrTro INTERNAZIONALE PRIVATO 197-265 (x895).
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The opportunity is now at hand to put this knowledge to use in contemporary
Africa, not, of course, by slavish copying, but by conscious adaptation of principles
in so far as they may be found to be useful and acceptable.
The third and last aspect of legal pluralism to which I would here refer is the
question of the inter-action between, and the mutual accommodation of, Romanistic
and English common law systems in a single political unit. In their more poetic
moments comparative lawyers are wont to talk about the fusion of two great
streams of legal thought-Anglo-American and Romanistic. I like to think that
this may be more than an idle dream, and that one of the chief areas of fusion
will be contemporary Africa; 4 for it is perhaps not sufficiently realized how
strong and widespread Romanistic legal elements are in Africa. The whole of
Southern Africa, a major part of the Central African Federation, the Congo and the
Portuguese territories, vast areas of West Africa, and parts of North Africa and
Ethiopia-all have powerful infusions of Romanistic legal elements. And what is
more to the point, there are several important areas in which English and Romanistic
legal ideas are having to find a mutual modus vivendi, for example, in South Africa
and in Southern Rhodesia where English ideas and an uncodified Romanistic
system (Roman-Dutch law) have long co-existed and have tended either to fuse or
complement each other. Interesting developments along similar lines may occur
in the Cameroons, as between English law and a local codified French law, and, of
course, in other parts of Africa, if Pan-African aspirations are fulfilled.
These considerations have a palpably close bearing on the subject of legal educa-
tion, and especially on the role of comparative law, which will be discussed
presently.
C. The Reform of Private Law
Passing on now to the subject of law reform, I shall be very brief. The priorities
within the field of private law are reasonably clear: land-tenure, commercial and
industrial transactions, marriage and succession. These are the subjects which
increasingly claim the attention of the African law reformer
4 2
The traditional patterns of land tenure and land use in Africa are not wholly
adequate to cope with the need for big increases in the production of food and
other wealth by the use of modern agricultural and industrial methods. Nor, as it
seems to many, do the old systems give adequate security of title in communities
rapidly converting to a full-scale money economy. And, perhaps more important
still, there exist few accurate statements in legally precise language of the old
customary systems themselves. Inadequacy of rule in this important field is un-
fortunate enough, but uncertainty is intolerable. At the same time reform of land
tenure is an exceptionally difficult and delicate task; for powerful interests are
almost invariably involved, and the ramifications of change are often more far-
"If Britain joins the Common Market, Europe would, of course, be a focus of interest in this regard.
" See, generally, THE Lo~Nox CONFERENCE ON THE FuTuRrE oF LAw IN AFRICA, RPEoiD OF TM PRO-
CEEDINGS (Allott ed. 596o). See 4 J. AFRICAN LAw I (196o).
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reaching than may appear at first sight. Years of arduous work lie ahead in this
fieldV3
The claim to attention of modern commercial and industrial law is no less
compelling, as is evident, for example, from the recent scholarly reports and practical
work undertaken in Ghana on company legislation and the law of insolvency-
work in which Professor L. C. B. Gower, of the London School of Economics, has
played so distinguished a part.44 Nor should the welding force of a uniform
commercial code be lost from sight in those areas where experiments in closer
political association and nation-building are now taking place.4
Again, in this time when economic and political changes are sweeping through
Africa, family law, succession and the status of women must inevitably attract the
attention of the law reformer. The increasingly important role which African women
are playing in politics, the effect of urbanization, and the influence of religion are
all leading to substantial modifications of the old mores.
D. Constitutional and Administrative Law
And now, having dealt at some length with topics of private law, it is time
to pass on to the subject of constitutional and administrative law. The field is vast,
so vast that it may seem almost an impertinence to attempt any kind of brief
survey.40 I propose, therefore, to pass rapidly and virtually without comment over
many topics which, if space permitted, I would wish to deal with more adequately,
both because of their importance and by reason of long sustained personal interest.
I can, for example, do no more here than mention as worthy of serious academic
study and research in first-class law schools anywhere such subjects as the appro-
priateness and potential development of institutions of government when trans-
planted or grafted abroad;4" the use that may be made of second chambers in a
bicameral legislative system to accommodate a traditional chieftainship, or as one of
the safeguards of a particular constitutional structure;4" the relative merits of presi-
dential and parliamentary "types" of executive government in contemporary Africa;
"There is a voluminous and ever-growing literature on the reform of land tenure. See, for example,
A BIBLIOGRAPH" OF PUBLISHED SOURCES RELATING TO AFRICAN LAND TENURE (Colonial Office, London
I950); FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF LAND TENURE
(1955); U.N. DEP'T OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, LAND REFORMS: DEFECTS IN AGRARIAN STRUCTURE AS
OBSTACLES TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (ST/ECA/ii) (U.N. Pub. Sales No. 1951II.B.3 .); REPORT OF
THE WORKING PARTY oN AFRICAN LAND TENURE IN KENYA (1958).
"The relevant reports were published in Accra in 196i.
"As suggested by Professor Arthur Macmahon at the Symposium on Federalism in the New Nations,
held under the auspices of the Center for Legal Research (New Nations), Chicago University Law School,
in February, 1962: "It would be interesting to speculate what the history of the United States might
have been had commercial law been a subject reserved to the federal legislature."
4' For a short but valuable survey dealing with an important part of the field, see INT'L COMM'N OF
JURISTS, AFRICAN CONFERENCE ON THE RULE OF LAW (g6i).
'
This is the subject of a study soon to be published by the Duke University Commonwealth Studies
Center.
" A subject discussed at the Kenya Constitutional Conference held at Lancaster House, London, in
February x962, and of obvious interest in many other parts of Africa.
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the potential role of hereditary Paramount Chiefs as Heads of State;4 9 techniques
of constitution-drafting and their suitability in particular situations-whether, for
example, in drafting constitutional guarantees in African territories creative am-
biguity is preferable to specific detail and definition; the advantages and dis-
advantages of the judicial review of legislation and governmental action by the
ordinary courts or by special constitutional courts, and the various possible
alternatives; the techniques and styles of constitutional interpretation; the meaning
and significance of various conceptions of the separation of governmental powers;
the drafting of criminal codes and penology, especially in areas where Islamic
influence is strong, and so on.
These are matters some of which, no doubt, may best be dealt with in a university
law school in collaboration with the department of government; but whatever the
arrangement, they should not be ignored by lawyers, and especially not by those
interested in African public law.
Now, while I must be content here with the bare enumeration of the above-
mentioned topics, there are a few matters within the field of public law which
I would like to discuss a litde more specifically.
In the first place I think that it would be short-sighted for English-speaking
law schools to concentrate on English and American ideas, admirable and relevant
as they are, to the exclusion of all others in the study and exposition of constitutional,
and especially administrative law. This practice, regrettably not infrequent, seems
to derive in some quarters from a peculiar notion that all continental or Roman-
istically-based constitutional regimes are adverse to freedom.50 Continental public
law is, however, a storehouse of principle of considerable significance for con-
temporary Africa.
Consider, for example, ideas and practices like the modern continental alternatives
to judicial review by the ordinary courts, or the German idea that, in the interests
of freedom, legislation should apply generally 51-- especially legislative exceptions to
constitutional guarantees-and that the need for protection should be focussed on
administrative, rather than on legislative action. Not only are these ideas interesting
in themselves, but they may well play an increasingly important role in Africa gen-
erally, by no means exclusively in areas where continental influence has in the past
been strong.5 2  If, as I believe, there is always a strong case for teaching consti-
tutional and administrative law comparatively, it is especially strong in regard to
contemporary Africa, which seems healthily determined to remain flexible in the
pursuit of precedent and example.
" A subject of considerable current interest and technical complexity in Uganda, Barotseland, Basuto-
land, and Swaziland.0 It seems hardly necessary to point out that continental systems are not necessarily enmeshed in
maxims like quod principi placuit vigorem legis habet.
See, e.g., article ig of the Basic Law of the West German Republic.
ns The influence of French ideas on the enforceability of constitutional guarantees has already made
itself felt in the former British Cameroons; and the appointment of a Swiss constitutional lawyer to advise
the KANU delegation at the recent Kenya Constitutional Conference (February 1962) is not without sig-
nificance.
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I turn now to more fundamental considerations which relate to what may
be described as the challenge of contemporary Africa. Africa presents many chal-
lenges, two of which, however, are very relevant to our present subject. To begin
with, there is a basic challenge to the Africans themselves; then there is an equally
fundamental challenge which Africa presents to the rest of the world. I shall
try to deal with each in turn.
The challenge to Africans is concerned very largely with the idea of freedom.
Will the new African governments be equal to the challenge which freedom itself
presents? Every African nationalist, in fact almost every articulate African, if asked
what he means by freedom, in an African context, will tell you that part of the
answer is that it means freedom from external control, freedom from colonialism.
In other words, it means independence or self-determination-freedom to go one's
own way, to learn by one's own efforts, and from one's own mistakes. When asked
to pursue the analysis beyond mere freedom from external control, Africans usually,
and very understandably, go on to include freedom from poverty, freedom from
illiteracy and ignorance, freedom from ill-health, and freedom from the hardship
and cruelty which exist when a society lacks a basic minimum of social security
and social services.
And it is precisely at this point that Africa comes face to face with a fundamental
challenge. The classic freedoms of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, among
which the civil liberties and human rights enshrined in the United States Constitu-
tion and its amendments may be regarded as typical, all involve freedom from gov-
ernmental action. They are in essence limitations upon what the state may legiti-
mately do, statements of what governments may not do. But it has become
increasingly clear in the twentieth century that there are essential services which
the state not only can but also should undertake for its citizens. It is no longer
sufficient to specify what may not be done; increasingly attention is being given to
the state's positive duty to provide an environment in which the classic freedoms may
be effectively enjoyed.P
Writing on this point some ten years ago, an Indian philosopher and poet,
Humuyun Kabir, said.
The problem of the twentieth century is to reconcile the conflicting claims of liberty and
security. A new charter of human rights must secure to each individual, irrespective of
race, color, sex or creed, the minimum requirements for human existence, namely, (a)
the food and clothing necessary for maintaining the individual in health, (b) the housing
necessary for protection against the weather and for allowing space for relaxation and
enjoyment of leisure, (c) the education necessary for developing the latent faculties, and
(d) the medical and sanitary services necessary for checking and curing disease and
for insuring the health of the individual and the community.
53 The point was emphasized at the Conference on the Rule of Law sponsored by the International
Commission of Jurists at New Delhi in 1959. For a report on this Conference, see INT'L COM.'N OF
Juiusrs, THE ROLE OF LAw IN A FREE SociETy (196o).
' Kabir, Human Rights: The Islamic Tradition and the Problems of the World Today, in HUMAN
RIGHSr, COMMENTS AND INTERPIEFTATIONs-A Sympsosiums 191-94 (UNESCO, 1949).
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Kabir is, no doubt, correct in seeing the problem as one of reconciling liberty
and security. But how is this to be done; how is one to secure an adequate sufficiency
of both interests?
The problem is difficult enough in the older countries of the West, which are
already richly endowed with amenities, and where grinding poverty, illiteracy, and
ill-health are, on the whole, more the exception than the rule. In these countries it
is mainly the threat of global war which tends to arm the state with inflated power
and threatens to erode both freedom and wealth. But in Africa today, for the
majority of the people, hunger, illiteracy, and sickness are still a terrible scourge.
Add to this the fact that communications and basic civic amenities remain rudi-
mentary in vast areas of the continent, and take into account also the very under-
standable impatience of political leaders to effect a change, and the perennial problem
of insuring human liberty takes on almost awesome proportions.
Democracy and human freedom will always have hard going where they are
faced with grinding poverty, ill-health, and lack of education. The going will be
even harder where, as is often the case in the new nations, it is sought to compress
a century of gradual development into, say, ten years. And it is for this reason that
many friends of Africa have asked sympathetically, but not without misgiving: can
the independent African states take their place in the modern world as free
democratic societies; can they provide the amenities and security which their people
yearn for without resorting to dictatorship and the eradication of human freedom?
Faced with the evils referred to above, it is not surprising that some African
politicians tend to attach more importance to the provision of security than to the
safeguarding of individual liberty. Indeed, a few have become openly impatient
with the whole idea of civil liberty and the restraints it places upon state action.
For the time being, they say, the classic nineteenth century freedoms, however de-
sirable in themselves, may, alas, have to remain for them and their people a luxury
which cannot be afforded. The active enforcement and more particularly the
judicial enforcement of these liberties is seen by them, for the present at any rate,
as an undesirable and often unpredictable fetter upon the ability of the state to
provide essential amenities and security.
Often, too, in discussion with practical politicians, one finds that doubts concerning
the constitutional guarantee of liberty are pressed to even more fundamental levels.
I have known several African intellectuals raise the question whether, in essence,
the classical constitutional limitations presuppose and, indeed, buttress economic
individualism, which may or may not be acceptable in the particular new society
with which one is concerned, however fundamental the concept may be in most
Western democracies. In short, there is influential support for the view that "the
demands of security must take precedence over the demands for liberty in respect
of the minimum human needs," which, incidentally, is the conclusion that Humuyun
Kabir himself reached. 5
55 Id. at 193.
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Here, then, is a fundamental issue, a great challenge, now being fought out with
particular urgency in Africa. Can it be demonstrated that the democratic pro-
cedures, and the legal institutions which have protected civil liberty in the West, are
in fact capable of adjustment so as to accommodate the clamant need of new nations
for rapid economic growth without losing their essential character in the process
of accommodation and adaptation?
While I do not for one moment deny the great importance of providing social
and economic security, I do utterly repudiate the notion that the provision of these
benefits should be given pride of place above all other freedoms. In fact, as I see it,
we are faced here with one of the deepest issues between Russia and her satellites
on the one hand, and the would-be free world on the other.
Under the Russian system the state claims to be the universal provider, with
the result that the individual ceases to count at all. This, in my view, is deeply
immoral;- for though there are many services which the state should undertake for
men, its prime duty is to create the conditions which permit its members to act
freely within the law for themselves. Indeed a state which purports to be a uni-
versal provider actually wrongs men by treating them contrary to their nature; for
a man's first duty is to fulfill his nature by assuming the responsibilities that are
his.
But quite apart from the moral ground to which I have referred, there are two
very practical reasons why individual men and women should, as far as possible,
be allowed to work out their own destiny free from state control and interference.
In the first place, once the state's claim to be a universal provider is acknowledged
or encouraged, it is very difficult to resist a further claim on its part to regiment men,
as indeed the history of communist Russia has proved. Moreover, human beings are
fallible, and no man or group of men is good enough to be entrusted with absolute
power over other men. Indeed, this is perhaps the decisive justification for re-
versible democratic government and for the freedom implicit in it to organize
opposition.
At the same time it is not sufficient merely to reject totalitarianism and fulminate
against communism. It is no less necessary to guard against the misuse of private
enterprise. Otherwise, one merely avoids one kind of slavery to fall victim to
another.
Under communism the means of production are controlled by the officers of the
state, who are the masters of the workers (that is to say, the slaves of the state), and
the wealth produced is distributed, at the discretion of state officials, among families
and individuals. At the other extreme-which is in my view equally pernicious-you
have unbridled private enterprise. This is the mark of what Hilaire Belloc, that
stern foe of communism, called "The Servile State."
But we are not necessarily doomed to suffer either of these grim ways. Else-
where I have argued that between the extremes of unbridled private enterprise,
or economic license, on the one hand, and state despotism on the other, there is a
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middle way, where it is possible to combine freedom for all with a necessary
minimum of economic benefit, opportunity and security for all, especially within
the fields of public health and education. 0 Elsewhere, too, I have ventured to give
my reasons for believing that the basic human freedoms are not irreconcilable with
rapid economic growth in underdeveloped countries.57  I do not propose to
elaborate these views here beyond saying two things.
In the first place, we should, I think, have no sympathy with those who
would attempt to force African realities Procrustes-fashion into Western political
and economic molds and who criticize newly independent African states on the
ground that their polities are not exact replicas of Western systems. Let us remember
that in trying to make an adjustment between welfare and personal freedom, the new
nations of Africa are faced with what must always be a very delicate problem of
balance, but which, currently in Africa, is exceptionally difficult. In their attempts
to meet this challenge they need sympathy and help rather than too impatient
criticism.
Secondly, there can be little doubt that in the difficult task of establishing and
maintaining what I have called the middle way, the law has a big role. For
example, laws preventing the abuse of economic power-among them, anti-monopoly
laws--can do much to help. But in themselves, laws of this kind are not enough,
for ultimately the institution of private property and free individual enterprise must
rest, not on greed or the will to win a rat-race, or on some sloppy economic optimism
that all happens for the best in the best of all possible worlds, but on a developed
sense of moral responsibility among the general body of citizens.
Let us, however, pause on this idea of moral responsibility, for it brings us to
the fundamental challenge which Africa presents to the rest of the world. Super-
ficially, one might question whether a continent as underdeveloped as Africa has any
challenge to offer to the old established nations, and especially to the West with
its great heritage of accomplishment. But a moment's reflection should dissipate
any such illusion.
The African challenge has, in the view of many, become highlighted by the
East-West struggle, by the Cold War; but it is essential to realize that the New Africa
does not wish to be a mere passive entity to be carved up between Russia and the
Western Alliance in a new, more subtle, era of colonialism, a colonialism of economic
influence and political ideology. The New Africa is determined, whatever the cost,
to be itself, to win self-confidence, and to resolve its own problems in its own way.
A short while ago Mr. Tom Mboya of Kenya brought these points into very
clear focus in a television interview in Chicago. He was asked where he, and
African nationalists generally, stood in the great struggle now going on between
Russia and the United States, more particularly between Russia and the Western
" D. V. CoWEN, LIBE.RTY, EQuALirY, FRATERNITY-ToDAY (The Hoern6 Memorial Lecture, Institute
of Race Relations, Johannesburg, i96I); D. V. COWEN, THE FOUNDATIONS OF FsR.Dom (Ig6i).
" See the works cited supra note 56.
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Alliance. He replied that African nationalists generally stood for a policy of non-
alignment with either the Western or the Eastern bloc. Africans preferred, he said,
to exercise an uncommitted and impartial judgment strictly in accordance with the
merits of each issue, rather than by reference to who the contesting parties might be.
Reminded of the perplexity which many westerners feel when faced with this
attitude of non-alignment or "positive neutralism"--a perplexity which has been
summed up in the question "How can you be neutral in a conflict between good
and evil"--Mr. Mboya began to develop a most powerful challenge.
Africans, he said, were by no means indifferent to moral issues. While in no
way committed to Russian policies, particularly Russian communism, Africans, he
suggested, could not accept that the West was a paragon of virtue to be followed
blindly at all times on all issues. To expect Africans to judge international issues on
an either-or basis, and solely in terms of the East-West conflict, was in his view
not only arrogant but unreasonably limiting. By the same token, he would not
expect Americans to fetter their judgment and limit their vision by choosing to be
either "Western Alliance Firsters" or, alternatively, "Africa Firsters." Rather, he
would expect an adult American, when asked the question (recently posed in an
influential journal)5s "Which friends come first-the New Africa or the Old Europe
in NATO?" to answer "It depends on the issue." On fundamentals, like equal
protection of the law regardless of color, the issue should, he felt, be decisive: there
was a right and a wrong, and wrong could not become right because one's old or
new friends espoused it.
Pressed a little harder, Mr. Mboya proceeded to throw out what I regard as the
really fundamental challenge. In effect he said: "We Africans are often perplexed
by the West's own confusion. Just what is it that you in the West do stand for?"
There is irony here and a most salutary lesson. Africa is sometimes viewed in
the West as a "primitive" continent. Yet it is this continent which is demanding of
the West that it rediscover itself, that it recall and rethink and re-apply its cultural,
moral, and spiritual principles.
And indeed who can doubt that all is not well with the West. There is, in fact,
an ominous parallel between the later years of the Roman Empire and our own
times. To quote St. Gregory, while superficially the world flourished, "in men's
hearts it had already withered-in cordibus aruerat." Similarly today, despite man's
technical achievements, there is inner doubt and tension and a groping for values
and meaningfulness which mock at the achievements themselves.
If the West believes that it has anything to offer other than technology and a high
degree of material comfort, it is urgent that besides training engineers and doctors,
it be able to interpret the ideals of good government which it professes to stand for,
and unfold the heart of the philosophy on which those ideals rest. But before
people can justify their beliefs to others, they must be able to justify them to them-
selves.
as White, Which Friends Come First?, Harper's Magazine, March 1962, p. 10o.
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We set much store upon safeguarding the rights of the individual human being,
and very rightly so. But to talk about human rights and human dignity without
comprehending human nature in its metaphysical dimension is meaningless, and so
to comprehend it means to see that human rights must be related to that moral law
which is rooted in being itself.
In a notable book, entitled "We Hold These Truths,"59 Father John Courtney
Murray has said that "the trouble is that even a damnable philosophy is more effective
than no philosophy at all." The West, then, must rediscover itself. And those who
value freedom, equality, and brotherhood, as opposed to communism or any other
totalitarian system, must cleave to the heart of the philosophy on which these values
depend. We must ask again the question which, of all questions, catalyzed the
development of Western civilization: What is man, and what are the purposes
which give meaning to his existence? And we must never lose sight of that question.
It is a vain and idle belief that all one has to do in order to build a stable and
just society is to call in the right constitution-makers, economists, and sociologists.
The finest constitutions, the most carefully devised Bills of Rights, are but scraps of
paper in the wind if the people who work them, and for whom they are meant,
are not worthy of them. No amount of economic aid, no program of social reform,
can avail a society where the individuals who comprise it have lost sight of the
nature of man and the function of society itself. Certainly constitutional guarantees
and Bills of Rights (about which there is so much talk in contemporary Africa) are
likely to be very shaky affairs unless men are agreed upon the philosophical basis on
which these fundamental rights rest.
In this regard Jacques Maritain has observed that, from the point of view of
philosophic doctrine, it may be said that in regard to human rights men are today
divided into two groups: those who to a greater or lesser extent explicitly accept and
those who to a greater or lesser extent explicitly reject natural law as the basis of
those rights. In the eye of the first, the requirements of his being endow man with
certain fundamental and inalienable rights antecedent in nature and superior to
society. These are the source of social life itself and of the duties and rights which
it implies. For the second school, man's rights are constantly variable and in a state
of flux, being entirely the product of society as it advances with the forward march
of history."°
The consequences of accepting one of these points of view rather than the other
are great; for it can, I think, be demonstrated that without the sense of direction
given to a society by an understanding of the natural law, and man's place within
its framework, power and expediency can become the highest arbiters of behavior
and of the enactments of the state, leaving the way wide open for dictators and
authoritarian governments on the premise that might is right.
'*JOHN COURTNEY MURRAy, WE HOLD THESE TnrHs 91 (196o).
"' Jacques Maritain, Introduction to HUMAN RIsS, COMMENTS AND INTERPRETAIONS-A SYMPosIum
13 (UNESCO, 1949).
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It is beyond the scope of this paper to attempt this demonstration; 0' nor is it
possible here to spell out what is meant by "natural law" in the Aristotelian-Thomistic
tradition-the version which alone would seem to be clear in regard to basic
principles, while giving full recognition to the importance of the actual experience
of time and place.62
I have raised the issue of natural law here, not to ride a hobbyhorse, but because
it cleaves to the heart of the subject with which we are concerned. Sooner or later
in any really serious discussion of human rights and their protection, the foundations
of the subject will be probed, as anyone with any experience of lecturing to a
critical African (or, indeed, any critical) audience knows well. At that point lawyers
may perhaps be forgiven for not being adherents of natural law in the Aristotelian-
Thomistic tradition, but it is less pardonable if their condition is based on an assured
and glassy ignorance, on equating Rousseau with, say, St. Thomas, or John Locke
with Hooker, or Descartes with Socrates (Karl Popper to the contrary notwith-
standing).
E. International Legal Studies
The themes we are now discussing are, of course, related also to the fifth of the
broad topics which I suggested earlier might be of dominant interest throughout
the African continent, namely, international relations and legal studies. Here again,
a generous and humane approach is needed. Apart from courses on what may be
called international law in the traditional sense, that is to say, the subject which
lawyers of my generation studied at some time in the pages of, say, Oppen-
heim or Hall, attention must plainly be given to the legal aspects of international
banking, business, and investment; to international organization and agencies for
cooperation; to the international aspects of various forms of constitutional structure
(for example, international voting rights in various federal or quasi-federal associa-
tions); to the ramifications of the European Common Market; and to the emergence
of comparable organizations in Africa.
Questions concerning the minimum legal requirements for the working of an
effective common market, and more especially the minimum of "uniformity" or
"harmonization" that may be required among the legal systems of the countries
comprising a common market, are of ever-increasing importance not only in
Europe but, in an intimately related way, in Africa and elsewhere.
3
But all this is familiar enough, and will not escape attention; it is necessary,
however, to go deeper. The notion of state sovereignty, which has so often stood
"'For an admirably lucid statement of the essentials, see JoHN WILD, PLATO'S MODERN ENEMIES AND
Tim THEORY oF NATuRAL LAw (1953). Professor Wild deals, inter alia, with the epistemological and
the metaphysical foundations of the subject, with the significance of contingent propositions, and espe-
cially with the Aristotelian idea of nature as a process of becoming-essential topics which lawyers not
infrequently overlook in discussions of natural law.
2See generally, GEOROES RENARD, LE DROIT, LA JUSTICE ET LA VOLONTE (1924); GEORoES RENARD,
LE Dtorr, L'ORDRE ET LA RAiSON (1927).
'" Luchaire, Le maintien et le renouvellement de l'association des ttats d'Alrique et de Madagascar
au Marchi Commun, in Penant, April/May, 1961, pp. x85-99.
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in the way of creating a world order of peace and justice among the older nations,
is a source of perplexity, too, among the new African nations. All over the continent
today political leaders are interested in plans for the closer association of states on a
Pan-African basis-plans which hold out much of promise for future economic de-
velopment and military defense. But always there lurks the danger of their coming
to grief because of a reluctance on the part of states to surrender to a supranational
organization any part of their newly-won sovereignty. 4
It is possible that the desired economic and military objectives may be achieved
in Africa without resorting to federalism of the classical kind, that is to say, without
any effective loss of sovereignty by the associating states, a contention put forward
in a very interesting paper by M. Gabriel d'Arboussier, of Senegal, at the Symposium
on Federalism in the New Nations held in the Law School of the University of
Chicago in February 1962.65 Others, however, are less sanguine about averting the
sovereignty issue; and it is perhaps significant that in some African constitutions-
notably that of Ghana-provision is made for the eventual surrender of sovereignty
in the interests of Pan-African solidarity. Time alone will show how effective this
may prove to be.
F. Legal Education
Africans are today deeply concerned with the kind of legal education which they
should foster. That purely technical courses will miss the mark is evident. At the
same time the need is urgent in several parts of Africa to train lawyers quickly for
the day-to-day run of legal work. Years of neglect have, in some territories, resulted
in a dearth of legally qualified Africans.66 Several subjects of a more scholarly and
reflective kind may therefore, for the time being, have to be excluded from curricula
of comparatively short duration which may be deemed sufficient to qualify for
junior professional work and even for junior judicial work. At the same time,
African needs will not be sufficiently met by routine training of a purely technical
kind.
As we have seen, African lawyers and statesmen are increasingly being called upon
to make decisions on legal problems which have basic and most far-reaching social
and economic significance; they cannot afford to make these decisions without
a liberal education, including, in particular, acquaintance with the previous experi-
ence of other peoples who have had to face similar problems.
African lawyers will fail in the exacting tasks which lie before them unless their
education is conceived in the grand manner and aims at being truly fundamental,
truly philosophical. However short of the goal one might fall in legal education, one
" Compare the reluctance of the states of the Netherlands to enter into anything more than a loose
confederation after winning liberation from the Spain of Phillip II, with the recent amendments of the
Netherlands Constitution so as to give precedence to international agreements.
"5I am at present editing the papers and proceedings; publication is expected in 1963.
" I understand that in Tanganyika today (May 1962) there are only four Africans who have pro-
fessional legal qualifications. An African friend once remarked that this is partly attributable to the
fact that students choosing, for example, agriculture and medicine were, in colonial days, given greater
encouragement on the ground that lawyers were troublemakers rather than trouble-shooters.
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must aim high. And nowhere is this more imperative than in the law schools of the
new nations. It was for this reason that in a public lecture which I delivered
at the University of Chicago in April 1959, I advocated the inclusion of com-
parative law, jurisprudence, and legal history in any realistically conceived cur-
riculum of African legal studies. My colleague, Professor Max Rheinstein, was and
still is receptive to the idea, but the general opinion at the time was that "first
things should come first," and that the first need in Africa is basic legal training of
a bread-and-butter kind.
However, elementary legal training of a more or less technical kind for the many
is not incompatible with the concurrent provision of something more ambitious.
The concurrent establishment of research institutes attached to the new African law
schools would surely not weaken them. On the contrary, it might enhance their
capacity to discharge essential teaching duties.
II
THE AMERCAN CONTRIBUTION
What can American institutions and American legal scholars usefully hope to
contribute and achieve in the field of African studies? Perhaps the first and most
essential fact to take into account is that African legal studies are at present, and for
some considerable time are likely to remain, in a state of flux. Dramatic and rapid
change is the dominant fact almost everywhere on the African continent; indeed in
some places the much-publicized winds of change have now reached hurricane
force. This naturally has an intimate bearing on the nature and possibilities of
significant academic work in this field. Pieces of purely descriptive writing on, for
example, the constitutional structure of particular African countries, and attempts at
constitution-making, have a disquieting tendency to be out of date almost as soon
as they are published or completed. Nevertheless, however frustrating it may be to
be overtaken and left behind by the march of events, work of this descriptive and
practical kind is important and must be undertaken.
Again, within the general field of legal education and research, it would seem
that during this period of rapid change and growth, research projects, teaching
methods, and especially the organization and content of courses and seminars, should
remain flexible, and-for some time-largely exploratory and experimental. And
for this reason, I have hesitated to put forward any ideas on the subject at all,
especially as a newcomer in a country which has proved itself to be so fertile in
resource. Nevertheless, I have ventured to put together a few tentative ideas, and
these are here set forth briefly.
First, a note of warning against over-indulgence in missionary zeal. I would
not dream of disparaging the present experiment of sending American legal scholars
to African law schools to help build them up. On the contrary, it would seem that
this endeavor is of considerable potential value and is being welcomed in Africa itself.
Nor would I presume to suggest that the distinguished gentlemen who have volun-
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teered to do this exacting work-among them Professor W. B. Harvey of the Univer-
sity of Michigan, now Dean of the University Law Department and Director of
Legal Education of Ghana-are not fully aware of what I am about to say.
But for the possible benefit of the less sophisticated I would make this plea: let
us be careful to keep our feet on solid earth.
It has sometimes been suggested, almost in hushed tones, that there is mission-
work for lawyers in this field, that lawyers imbued with Western values may carry
the light, so to speak, into the darknesses of Africa, and save it from communism
and other forms of totalitarianism. This is not only pathetically naive but positive-
ly harmful. It is naive because if any generalization about Africa, as a whole, can
safely be made, it is this: Africans desire complete and unfettered freedom to be
themselves; to build up their self-confidence and make their own distinctive contri-
bution, in their own way, to the art of living and social organization. It is harmful,
because they will reject anything savoring of what I have heard one of them
describe as "cultural imperialism," with no less vigor and angry contempt than
that with which they have already rejected political and economic imperialism.
And needless to say, they will deeply resent, and rightly resent, any hint of being
patronized.
Let us be quite clear, then, that one will get absolutely nowhere in the new nations
field if one embarks upon it after prejudging the issues and with inflexible pre-
conceptions about the role of law and legal institutions. Semper aliquid novi ex
Africa is likely to be as true in the field of law as it has been in other fields.
Rather than deceive ourselves with grandiose schemes about missionizing, we
should be humble enough to remember, and this is my second point, that teaching
is a two-way process, in which the teacher, if he is wise, is given an opportunity to
learn as much as he teaches. For example, anyone teaching constitutional law in
Africa would do well to remember that the idea of constitutionalism is no novelty
among Africans, and that indigenous African institutions have much to teach in
regard to the taming of power.67 No one would seriously suggest that the old ways
of disciplining tyrannous chiefs are fully applicable in a modern state, but modern
techniques are often only means of achieving ancient objectives; and it helps greatly
to give them vitality and acceptability if it can be shown that, despite their modern
garb, they are really old friends.
In a deep sense, of course-a very deep sense-there is mission work to do,
namely, the work of rediscovering and articulating, right here among established
Western communities, the real foundations of our own most cherished values. In
the long run, the values which are sometimes described as the "Western" way of
life, the values of human dignity and limited government in a free society, can only
survive anywhere if those who subscribe to them are able to give sound and con-
vincing reasons as to why they do so; as to why these values are good and right.
" The point has been emphasized by almost every informed writer on African institutions. See, for
example, JOHN MACLEAN, A COMPENDIUM OF KAFIR LAWS AND Cus-roMs 24 (1858); and among more
recent writings, I. Scmapsa., GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN TRIBAL SOCIETIES 135 (1956).
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And this is precisely what scholars in the new nations field, especially in Africa, are
so often challenged to do.
Let it be remembered, too, that in working back from contemporary needs and
application in the new nations to the relevance of established Western and other insti-
tutions as potential sources of guidance, and in explaining established institutions to
the peoples of new nations, who may desire, where practicable, to imitate successes and
avoid mistakes, the scholar in the new nations field is given a golden opportunity to
learn afresh, and with the stimulus of actuality, the true inwardness of much that we
take for granted and allow, at our peril, to go unanalyzed. In short, the virtue of
the exercise lies as much in what may be gained by the established nations, through
looking again at the foundations of their own life, as in what may be given to
the new nations. In this regard, the potential fillip that may be given to such subjects
as constitutional law and government, general jurisprudence, public international law,
and conflict of laws, can hardly be exaggerated.
Thirdly, I would like to elaborate a little on possible American programs within
the field of African legal studies. At the outset, I would stress again the importance
of remaining flexible and experimental; for there is very little experience anywhere
to guide us, and over-elaborate, long-term commitments in particular schools may
prove both costly and abortive. At the same time there are certain minimum require-
ments which, it is submitted, should be satisfied before any law school may fairly
be said to be seriously interested in African legal studies, and presently I shall try
to indicate what these requirements are.
Several possible approaches to African legal studies suggest themselves:
i. Some schools may prefer to confine themselves to introducing a little African
material by way of illustration or illumination in subjects such as jurisprudence,
constitutional law, administrative law, land-use, and problems of international
commerce and investment-all of these courses continuing to be offered as part of
the established curriculum for an ordinary American degree (probably on an
elective basis). There would certainly be nothing novel about this procedure.
It would not necessarily involve additions of staff, though perhaps a few seemingly
strange tomes may have to be added in those sections of law libraries which are
sometimes imperially reserved for "Anglo-American legal treatises." Possibly the
librarian might be persuaded to set aside a section of the shelf space for a small
collection of books on African law. But, however one looks at this first approach, it
could hardly be described as a serious venture in African legal studies.
2. Other schools may choose to edge warily somewhat further into the field. They
may do this by the recruitment to their staff of one or more persons with some
special knowledge of African legal studies; by organizing one or more courses of
instruction with an African focus; by encouraging African graduate students to
pursue a course of study in the law school; by sponsoring African research projects;
and by a serious attempt to build up comprehensive library facilities in African
law.
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For example, in the Law School of the University of Chicago the first steps have
been taken to offer a seminar or course on African legal problems, the focus of
the exercise being (a) to identify and discuss some of the main legal "problem
areas" in Africa; and (b) to consider how much of American legal experience is
relevant and capable of adaptation in Africa. A not dissimilar course had for some
time been offered by Professor Arthur Schiller at the Columbia Law School.
Work of this kind is, in my view, a high priority. Thus, apart from its in-
trinsic interest, it may help to throw light on what is actually needed, as well as
on what one may hope to accomplish, in the field of African legal studies.8 s More-
over, it may not be without relevance to the work of directors of graduate studies
in the United States, for there is a risk that African students in America may miss
taking courses which are of value in their own country and, conversely, give time
to those which prove to be of purely domestic interest.
It hardly needs demonstration that American ideas in the field of constitutional
law, to give a clear example, are of great interest in contemporary Africa. It
would therefore seem logical to offer, as at Chicago, a course or courses on compara-
tive constitutional and administrative law, with a substantial but by no means
exclusively African focus. In addition, courses on such subjects as international
law, international trade and investment, and the Common Market, could easily
be adapted to take in or emphasize topics of particular African interest.
While instruction of this kind plainly has something to offer to postgraduate
students from Africa, it should perhaps be emphasized that equal benefit may
accrue to American students, especially those contemplating work in the new
nations.
Assume the presence of four or five good postgraduate students from African
countries in a law school offering such a program,6 and one has what I would
describe as "the beginnings of a center of African legal studies." But courses
and seminars of this kind are only the beginnings. Much more is needed if the
"center" is to survive and make the kind of contribution which should be made.
Among these additional requirements, I would enumerate specifically the following:
(a) building up a library containing the major African legal materials. This is,
of course, a very costly and difficult undertaking, for many items other than
strictly legal ones should be made easily accessible, and the whole collection
should be brought together in a special section of the library. Again, quite
apart from the questions of cost and library organization, much of the essential
material is out of print. But the difficulties are not insuperable, and it is
still possible over a period of, say, five to ten years, to build up major collections
of African legal (and complementary) materials in perhaps four or five big
Thanks largely to the enthusiasm and dedicated work of a fine body of students, this was made mani-
fest to the present author in the first seminar course of this kind offered by the University of Chicago
during the winter of 1962.
"Again, it is at present the policy of the Law School in the University of Chicago to assist good
African students at the post graduate level.
LAw AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
centers in the United States. Indeed, substantial collections are already in exist-
ence in the libraries of several American law schools, and some of them could
with little trouble be developed so as to become really great collections;7°
(b) provision of facilities for uninterrupted research and publication. In due
course African universities and African research institutes will, one hopes,
have the library and other resources to embark in full measure on major
research in African legal studies. And in due course, too, one hopes, they will
play-and certainly they should be encouraged to play-the leading role in
this field. But there are at present few such institutions, 71 though the need
for them grows daily more urgent. It is here, I think, that the bigger
centers of learning in America might make one of their more important
contributions. A comparatively small staff of academic collaborators, say,
four men well acquainted with African conditions,72 who are given time and
favorable conditions to do basic research, could do work which might not only
be an addition to scholarship, but which might also be esteemed in Africa as
as contribution towards the solution of the many problems which there
present themselves. Indeed, in this latter regard, it should not be overlooked
that in the formative years, while centers of higher legal learning and research
are finding their feet among the new nations of Africa, research projects which
are based abroad may have a certain advantage by the very fact of detachment.
3. A far more elaborate venture would be the establishment of a school of African
and Oriental Studies along the lines of the London prototype, in which law would
be one part of the program, the whole being affiliated, more or less closely, to a
university. It is possible that one or more of those American universities which
already have well-established centers of African studies in the fields of anthropology
or political science may wish to develop along these lines.73
4. Some of the major centers may prefer to integrate African legal studies into the
work of large Institutes of Comparative Law, or centers of International Legal
Studies, associated with the law school, and indeed with the university as a whole,
but separately housed and with some measure of financial and other autonomy.
This approach could be very fruitful indeed, but it is, of course, far more ambitious
and costly than the kind of "step-by-step" venture discussed above.
Fourthly, I would suggest that in developing the American contribution, one
should not become bogged down by attempts to force "African legal studies" into
fixed categories, such as "area studies," or "comparative and foreign law," or "inter-
national legal studies," and so on. Discussions along these lines seem to engender
"oThe collection at Harvard is probably already in this category, or very near it.
"' South Africa with its comparatively long and diversified university experience is, perhaps, in a
special category.
72 Including an expert on the various Islamic rites in Africa. See, generally, J. N. D. ANDERSON,
THE FuTuRE OF IsaAmic LAw IN AFR IcA (1954).
"'There are already a substantial number of such centers in the United States, among them North-
western University, Johns Hopkins, the University of California, Boston University, and the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology.
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more heat than light, however useful a particular label may be for fund-raising. In a
sense, African legal studies may be embraced under any of these rubrics, though in
my view the great range of legal systems involved in Africa and the diversity of that
enormous Continent make "African law" far less of a unified and manageable "area
study" than, say, Chinese, Japanese, or Russian legal studies. No doubt, when the
legal problem areas of Africa have been properly identified, various institutions may
be depended upon to choose their own categorizations to suit their own purposes.
Meanwhile it appears to be more important to obtain clarity about what one means
by "African legal studies," and to get on with the actual and pressing job of doing
work in the field.
Fifthly, I would like to call attention to the very special importance which
attaches to interdisciplinary cooperation. For example, a lawyer embarking on a
project for the improvement of land tenure without the assistance of a competent
social anthropologist to explain the ramifications of various legislative proposals on,
say, the position of the chieftainship (which may rest on power to allocate land),
is likely to find that his carefully devised plans will never reach the point of "take-
off." Then, again, even a potentially workable plan has to be popularized. In
this regard, in addition to the skills of the social anthropologist and perhaps the
social psychologist, one cannot afford to ignore the contribution which may be made
by the practical administrator who is in touch with day-to-day realities.
In the African field it is particularly important to learn the idiom-not necessarily
the language (desirable as this may be)--of the people with whom one is dealing.
One must make an effort to grasp the concepts and images with which they are
familiar. If one is, for example, to explain American realities to Africans, this must
be done in language, and with the help of concepts and idiom, which is meaningful
to Africans, and vice versa. The "judicial process," for example, among the Lozr in
Barotseland is not the same phenomenon as the judicial process in the state of
Illinois, and it may not be helpful to expound either in terms of the other. Greater
facility in communication is one of the many advantages which interdisciplinary
cooperation, especially between lawyers, social anthropologists, economists, and
political scientists, may bring in its train.
But most of this is familiar to all but the veriest tyro and is not likely to be
forgotten. And so I come to my sixth and last point, one which is no less obvious,
perhaps, than the need for interdisciplinary cooperation, but which in the excitement
of new ventures might sometimes tend to be forgotten. I refer to the need for law
teachers in the various universities working in the new nations field to cooperate
among themselves as scholars whose first allegiance should be to the task of expand-
ing the frontiers of knowledge and usefulness, and helping each other to do so.
This applies not only to relations between American universities, but also, and perhaps
particularly, to Anglo-American, Franco-American, and Afro-American relations
in this field.
The subject is worthwhile, potentially even great. It behooves us to be worthy
of it.
